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Judicial Protection of the Right to
Health in Colombia: From Social
Demands to Individual Claims to Public
Debates
By ALICIA ELY YAMIN* AND OSCAR PARRA-VERA**
I. Introduction
Even in a region characterized by a number of countries with
robust constitutions and judicial enforcement of social rights,
Colombia stands out as a striking example of judicial activism
regarding health rights. Better known outside the region for its
brutal fifty-year-old civil conflict, it seems startling if not
paradoxical that the Colombian Constitutional Court (the Court) has
developed some of the most progressive jurisprudence in the world
with respect to economic, social and cultural rights. The Colombian
context indeed presents many contrasts: a long tradition of creating
democratic institutions coexists with authoritarianism and alarming
levels of political and social violence, and entrenched poverty
persists despite years of strong economic growth.' The extreme
social inequality in Colombia is reflected in its health statistics,
where national averages mask deep disparities that run along urban
* Joseph H. Flom Fellow on Global Health and Human Rights, Harvard Law
School; Adjunct Lecturer, Harvard School of Public Health; and Senior Researcher,
Christian Michelsen Institute (Norway).
** Senior Staff Attorney, Inter-American Court of Human Rights and
Researcher, Group of Research in Contemporary Political Theory, National
University of Colombia.
1. Francisco Gutikrrez Sanin and Gonzalo Sinchez G6mez, Prologue to
Instituto de Estudios Politicos y Relaciones Internacionales, NUESTRA GUERRA SIN
NOMBRE: TRANSFORMACIONES DEL CONFLICTO EN COLOMBIA 11, 11-32 (Maria Emma
Wills 0. ed., 2009); see also Eduardo Sinchez and Andrs Vargas, Reporte
Macroecon6mico No. 20: Bolsas emergentes: lUna nueva burbuja? y Crecimiento
econ6mico y desigualdad: la situaci6n colombiana, BOLETIN MENSUAL DEL OBSERVATORIO
ECONOMIcO, FINANCIERO Y EMPRESARIAL (2009).
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versus rural divides, as well as racial, ethnic and class lines.2
Nowhere has Colombia's judicialization of social demands been
more striking than in the health domain. According to a report by
the Human Rights Ombudsman's Office of Colombia, between 1999
and 2008, a stunning 674,612 actions for protection of constitutional
rights were filed before the courts in relation to health issues; the
Court itself has taken more than a thousand health cases since its
formation.3 By 2008, it was clear that recourse to the courts had
become an essential "escape valve" in a health system that was
incapable of regulating itself; but the routinization of judicial
intervention had created additional problems.4 In July of 2008, the
Court issued a sweeping decision aimed at improving the equity
and oversight of the health system and, in turn, stemming the tide of
litigation.5 In that T-760/08 judgment, the Court examined systemic
failures in the regulation of the health system, re-asserted the
justiciability of the right to health, and called for significant
restructuring of the health system based on rights principles. 6 The
extent to which the government will fully comply with the
judgment, and the longer term impacts on health equity, are yet to
be seen. Nevertheless, 'the manner in which the Uribe
administration has responded to date, provides certain indications
about the possibilities of and challenges to improving social justice
in health in Colombia through court-centered strategies.
In this article, we first explore what factors led to the
extraordinary level of judicial activism in health that Colombia has
experienced. We then examine the evolving nature of the Court's
2. Colombia has a Gini coefficient of 58.5, reflecting a level of economic
inequality that is among the highest in the world. U.N. Dev. Programme [UNDP],
Human Development Report 2009: Overcoming Barriers: Human Mobility and Dev.,
available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_2009_EN-Complete.pdf (last
visited Nov.15, 2009).
3. Defensoria del Pueblo (Ombudsman's Office of Colombia), LA TUTELA Y EL
DERECHO A LA SALUD. PERfODO 2003-2005 29, 77-79 (2007); Defensoria del Pueblo, LA
TUTELA Y EL DERECHO A LA SALUD. PERiODO 2006-2008 30 (2009) [hereinafter Defensora
del Pueblo 2006-08].
4. Procuraduria General de la Naci6n (PGN/Attomey General's Office) and
Centro de Estudios de Derecho, Justicia y Sociedad (Dejusticia), EL DERECHO A LA
SALUD EN PERSPECTIVA DE DERECHOS HUMANOS Y EL SISTEMA DE INSPECCION,
VIGILANCIA Y CONTROL DEL ESTADO COLOMBIANO EN MATERIA DE QUEJAS EN SALUD
(2008) [hereinafter PGN/DejuSticia].
5. Colombian Constitutional Court, Second Panel of Review, Judgment T-
760/2008.
6. Id. at sec. 3.
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judicial intervention, culminating in Judgment T-760/08, and the
impact that judicial intervention has had in terms of financial and
policy impacts as well as equity. After describing how the Executive
has responded to the T-760/08 judgment thus far, including the
issuance of a declaration of emergency with respect to the health
system, we offer some preliminary reflections on the potential
impact of judicial intervention in terms of promoting the right to
health in Colombia.
II. Factors Leading to the Judicialization of Health Rights in
Colombia
The story of the Constitutional Court's role in enforcing health
rights begins in the early 1990s, amid the conflicting aims of an
aspirational Constitution, which enshrined broad social rights and
set out a new vision for Colombian society, on the one hand, and a
sweeping health sector reform based upon neoliberal principles on
the other.
7
The reforms implemented through Law 100 in 1993 were
premised on the superiority of market-based allocation of health
care. However, what Law 100 envisioned was far from an
unregulated market. Unlike a normal private insurance scheme,
Law 100 set up a hybrid scheme whereby private insurance
companies did not set the capitation rates, did not define
deductibles or premiums, did not set the content of benefits
packages, and did not control whom to insure.8 Further, given the
complex array of providers and insurers, the state also had a
substantial role to play in regulation. Over time, the contradictions
inherent within Law 100 produced fault lines which, together with
regulatory failures, led to the crisis in the system.
Under Law 100, a managed care system was coupled with a
defined benefits package to be provided under a national insurance
scheme (Plan Obligatorio de Salud, or POS) through an individual
capitation. Law 100 also introduced a two-tier system of benefits:
(a) the contributory regime (POS-C) for those formally employed or
earning more than twice the minimum wage; and (b) the subsidized
regime (POS-S), which under Law 100 had a capitation set at one-
7. Mauricio Garcia Villegas, Law as Hope. Constitutions, Courts and Social Change
in Latin America, 16 FLA. J. INT'L L. 133, 140-42 (2004).
8. Interview with Juan Manuel Diaz Granados, President, ACEMI, in Bogota,
Colom. (Mar. 24, 2009).
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half of that for the contributory regime and included approximately
half the benefits.9
Although it has fallen short of the universal coverage called for
under Law 100, insurance enrollment has quite steadily increased,
as has health spending.10 In 2008, Colombia spent 7.8% of its GDP
on the health sector, which is above average for the region, and
substantially more than it did in 1993.11 In addition to public
expenditure, the system is financed through payroll taxes, and there
is a cross-subsidy from the contributory regime to the subsidized
regime.12 This reliance on payroll taxes proved to be a fatal flaw in a
country where increasingly workers were forced into the informal
sector.
Since 1993, Colombia's health reform has at times been cited as
a success story in international circles.' 3 However, within Colombia
9. Beatriz Plaza, Ana Beatriz Barona, and Norman Hearst, Managed competition
for the poor or poorly managed competition? Lessons from the Colombian health reform
experience, 16 (Supplement 2) HEALTH POLICY AND PLANNING 44-51 (2001); Amanda
Glassman, After a Decade: Health Insurance in Colombia Law 100 of 1993, 2007 Global
Health Council Conference, Health Systems 20/20 Auxiliary Session (May 20,
2007), available at http://www.healthsystems2020.org/content/resource/detail/
1927/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2009); William D. Savedoff, Inter-American Dev. Bank,
Reaching the Poor through Demand Subsidies: The Colombian Health Reform (2000),
available at http://www.iadb.org/SDS/doc/COHealthReform.pdf (last visited
Nov. 14, 2009).
10. Savedoff, supra note 9. By 2009, close to 90% of the population had health
insurance, but the majority of the uninsured remain in rural areas and come from
the lowest quintiles.
11. Ministerio de Hacienda y Cr~dito Pdblico, Presupuesto General de la
Naci6n, Seguridad y Confianza para el Desarrollo Social - Mensaje Presidencial, available
at http://www.minhacienda.gov.co/portal/ page/portal/MinHacienda/hacienda
public/presupuesto/programacion/proyecto/2008/Mensaje % 20Presidencial %202
30%20PM.pdf (last visited Oct. 5, 2009); Ministerio de Hacienda y Cr~dito Pdblico,
Texto Proyecto de Ley de Presupuesto General de la Nacion 2008, available at
http://www.minhacienda.gov.co/portal/page/portal/MinHacienda/haciendapu
blica/presupuesto/programacion/proyecto/2008/PROYECTO%20DE%20LEY%20
PGN%202008%2OFinal.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2009).
12. The 12.5% payroll tax, 4% of which is paid by the employee, is among the
highest in the region, and is additional to payroll taxes for social security. Further,
1% of payments made within the contributory regime are used as a cross-subsidy
for the subsidized regime. FROM FEW TO MANY: TEN YEARS OF HEALTH INSURANCE
EXPANSION IN COLOMBIA (Maria-Luisa Escobar, Amanda Glassman, and Ursula
Giedion, eds., 2009).
13. See, e.g., id.; Note also that the WHO ranked Colombia 33 out of all health
systems in the 2000 World Health Report, while the US was ranked 37. World
Health Organization [WHO], The World Health Report 2000, Health Systems:
Improving Performance (2000).
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the system established under Law 100 has been criticized by actors
from all sides of the political spectrum, both with respect to its
original conception and its operation. A basic source of inequity lay
in the design of the system itself. That is, although Law 100 called
for the two schemes to be unified by 2001, in practice this had not
occurred. 14 While those who are able to pay participate in the
contributory regime, those who are not are assigned to the
subsidized regime, which provides far fewer benefits. 15
A second fundamental problem lay in the definition of the
benefits packages themselves. They lacked clarity, an evidence base,
and prioritization mechanisms. Although Law 100 was ostensibly
intended to make social choices about health care explicit by
establishing a defined benefits program, it left an inordinate number
of what have come to be called "gray zones," where it is unclear
whether a given procedure, medication or service is covered. For
example, in joint replacement surgery, it is uncertain whether the
prosthetic joint is included in coverage for the procedure.' 6
The operation of this system has been plagued by chronic
problems as well. For example, when goods and services are not
included in the POS, but are nevertheless ordered by a court, the
government reimburses the Health Maintenance Organization
(HMO) through a solidarity fund (FOSYGA, according to its
Spanish acronym).1 7 However, such reimbursement has been
14. Indeed, the Court had heard abstract review cases questioning this division
before T-760/08, in which it had deferred to the executive and legislature to
determine when it would be financially feasible to unify the programs. See infra
Part V; Boletin Estadistico Sectorial 2005, available at http://www.minproteccionsocial
.gov.co/VBeContent/Estadistica/BoletinEstadistico_2005/1_2%20%20AFILIACI%
C3%93N%20A%20SALUD.pdf (last visited Feb. 14, 2009).
15. Ministerio de la Protecci6n Social, Bolet'n Estadistico Sectorial 2005, available
at http://www.minproteccionsocial.gov.co/VBeContent/Estadistica/Boletin_
Estadistico_2005/1_2%20%20AFILIACI%C3%93N%20A%20SALUD.pdf (last
visited Feb. 14, 2009).
16. See infra Part IV.
17. When goods and services are not included in the POS-C, but are
nevertheless ordered by a court, a government solidarity and guarantee fund
(Fondo de Solidaridad y Garantia, FOSYGA) reimburses the public or private
insurance company providing such good or service. When goods and services are
not included in the POS-S, but are nevertheless ordered by a court, the state
government reimburses the HMOs providing such good or service if it is included
in the POS-C. That is, the municipalities and regions cover the difference between
the POS-C and the POS-S, if and when a service or medication is ordered through
tutela, and the FOSYGA covers anything beyond the POS-C. Reimbursements from
FOSYGA have been so inordinately slow that, according to the insurance
2010]
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inordinately slow.'8 Moreover, despite the existence of multiple
oversight bodies, reports by the Human Rights Ombudsman's
Office and the Attorney General's Office in conjunction with the
non-governmental organization DeJuSticia documented virtually no
capacity to address complaints in a uniform and systematic
manner.19
In short, by 2008, when the Court issued its decision in T-
760/08, it had become clear that the system was incapable of
regulating itself. In 2008 alone, over 142,000 claims of health rights
violations were brought to the Colombian courts, and the majority
related to goods and services that should have been provided by
HMOs pursuant to the POS.20 As pointed out in the 2008 report
from DeJuSticia and the Attorney General's Office, the failure of
systemic oversight left judicial recourse as "the only escape valve." 21
A. Socio-political Context
In other contexts, widespread dissatisfaction with the health
system would have led to political or social responses. Indeed,
despite the state of the health system, the Constitutional Court
might not have played the central role in enforcing health rights that
companies, the situation came to threaten their very economic viability. LEY 100.
POR LA CUAL SE CREA EL SISTEMA DE SEGURIDAD SOCIAL INTEGRAL Y SE DICTAN OTRAS
DISPOSICIONES (1993) (Colom.); LEY 715 (2001) (Colom.).
18. Reimbursements from FOSYGA have been so slow that, according to the
insurance companies, the situation came to threaten their very economic viability.
At the same time, Governors have indicated that they do not have funds to cover
the non-POS care for the subsidized regime. El pr6ximo afio podrian desaparecer nueve
EPS; Fosyga les debe mds de $900.000 millones, EL TIEMPO (Colom.) (Nov. 12, 2009),
available at http://www.portafolio.com.co/economia/pais/ARTICULO-WEB-
NOTAINTERIORPORTA-6567527.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2009); Interview
with Juan Manuel Diaz Granados, supra note 8; see Jorge Correa, En riesgo salud de 3
millones de pobres por destinaci6n de presupuesto a compras no incluidas en el POS,
PORTAFOLIO (Colom.) (June 10, 2009), available at http://www.portafolio.com.co/
economia/economiahoy/ARTICULO-WEB-
NOTAINTERIORPORTA5409214.html (last visited Dec. 15, 2009).
19. PGN/DeJuSticia, supra note 4, at 81-104; see Defensoria del Pueblo 2006-08,
supra note 3; see also Diego L6pez Medina, Sistema de salud y derecho a la salud:
Historia de su interrelaci6n en la jurisprudencia constitucional RELATORIA EVENTOS 42-48
(Universidad de los Andes 2008) available at http://derecho.uniandes.edu.co/
derechouniandes/ export/ derecho uniandes/ facultad/rel_eventos3.html (last
visited Jan. 15, 2010).
20. Defensoria del Pueblo 2006-08, supra note 3, at 30.
21. See PGN/DeJuSticia, supra note 4, at 147.
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it has, but for the crisis in political representation.22 The enactment
of Law 100 in 1993 has been cited as the paradigm of health reform
by "change teams" - reforms that were rushed through the
legislative process and defined and implemented by teams of
technocrats, insulated from public debate and accountability. 23
Although the enactment of Law 100 was highly controversial, it was
pushed through the legislature shortly before the Christmas holiday
and then implemented as quickly as possible through decrees before
a change of presidential administration took place just months later.
Similarly, despite the presentation of alternative proposals for the
health system in 2007 when Law 100 was being reformed, the
legislative debate regarding Law 1122 lasted literally only minutes
before approval of the executive's proposal.24
If normal legislative and political channels for complaints
regarding health care were blocked, so too were avenues for social
mobilization.25 The armed conflict that has wracked the country for
half a century, coupled with authoritarian repression of dissent, has
had particularly devastating effects on the possibilities of social
mobilization around health policy. Colombia is an excellent
example of Asa Laurell's insight that it is fallacious that the state
"retracts" and merely allows the market to function when neoliberal
policies are undertaken.26 Laurell argues, "on the contrary, the state
plays a decisive and active role in dismantling its former institutions
and functions." 27 In Colombia, labor leaders and workers in the
22. See, e.g., Eduardo Pizarro Leongomez, Giants with Feet of Clay: Political
Parties in Colombia, in THE CRISIS OF POLITICAL REPRESENTATION IN THE ANDES 78, 78
(Scott Mainwaring et al., eds., 2006); David Landau, Political Institutions and the
Judicial Role in Comparative Constitutional Law, 51 HARV. INT'L L. J. (forthcoming
2010); Rodrigo Uprimny, Judicialization of politics in Colombia: Cases, Merits and Risks,
6 SUR 49 (2007).
23. For a definition of change teams and discussion of Law 100 reform, see
THOMAS J. BOSSERT, INTERNATIONAL HEALTH SYSTEMS GROUP, METHODOLOGICAL
GUIDELINES FOR ENHANCING THE POLITICAL FEASIBILITY OF HEALTH REFORM IN LATIN
AMERICA 38, 1 (2000).
24. Analysts have pointed to heavy lobbying from the pharmaceutical industry
and insurance companies. Interview with Felipe Galvis Castro, human rights
lawyer, in Bogota, Colom. (Mar. 24, 2009).
25. Instituto de Estudios Politicos y Relaciones Intemacionales, supra note 1, at
11-32.
26. Asa Cristina Laurell, Globalizaci6n y reforma de estado, in SAUDE, EQUIDADE E
GENERO: UM DESAFfO AS POLITICAS POBICAS 43 (A. M. Costa, E. Mrchan-Hamann, &
D. Tajer, eds., 2000).
27. Id.
20101
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health sector have been killed and brutally repressed in the context
of the politics of aggressive privatization.28 Complaints allege that
the government has deployed military units as well as death squads
to harass dissident health workers and leaders, and to occupy public
hospitals slated to be privatized or shut down.29 At the same time,
especially in rural areas, attacks on medical facilities and personnel
by illegal armed actors have been common, which has impacted
access to care and vaccination in some cases. 30 In some regions,
paramilitary groups control and essentially manage the budgets for
the subsidized regime, converting healthcare into another domain of
so-called "armed patronage."
31
At the same time that other avenues of recourse were closed to
people with health claims, the legal opportunity structure created by
the 1991 Constitution made seeking redress through the Colombian
courts extremely appealing.32 In addition to a broad expansion of
28. For example, the Asociaci6n Nacional de Trabajadores Hospitalarios de
Colombia (ANTHOC) has reported that between 1996 and 2007, 132 of its members
were killed. Moreover, ANTHOC has reported threats, burglaries, and several
instances of arbitrary detention of its members. See GILBERTO MARTINEZ GUEVARA,
ASoCIACION NACIONAL DE TRABAJADORES HOSPITALARIOS DE COLOMBIA, ANTHOC
ANTE EL GENOCIDIO Y LA LIQUIDACION (2008), available at http://www.anthoc
.org/index.php?option=comcontent&task=view&id-216 (last visited Apr. 8, 2010).
29. Interview with Extrabajadoras and extrabajadores del Instituto Materno
Infantil, in Bogota, Colom. (Mar. 28, 2009).
30. Ataques, amenazas y asesinatos a pacientes: entre las amenazas que enfrenta
personal de salud, REVISTA CAMBIO (Colom.), May 30, 2009, available at http://www
.cambio.com.co/paiscambio/830/ARTICULO-WEB-NOTAINTERIORCAMBIO-
5289253.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2010).
31. See, e.g., Alcalde de Riohacha busca acogerse a los beneficios de Ley de Justicia y
Paz, EL TIEMPO (Colom.), (Jan. 31, 2006); Maria Isabel, l Qu6 tan cierto es que el
paramilitarismo se tom6 la salud en Colombia? SEMANA (Colom.), Nov. 18, 2006,
available at http://www.semana.com/noticias-nacion/tan-cierto-paramilitarismo-
tomo-salud-colombia/98304.aspx (last visited Apr. 8, 2010); Patricia Ossa Ocampo,
Por enisima vez, el rigimen subsidiado en la palestra pliblica, 69 EL PULSO (Colom.), June,
2004, available at http://www.periodicoelpulso.com/htmI-/jun04/general/general-
03.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2010). In September of 2009, an ex Secretary of Health of
C6rdoba publicly admitted his links to paramilitary groups. Ivdn Bricefio, Ex
secretario de Salud de C6rdoba reconoci6 sus nexos con los paramilitares, RADIO SANTA FE
(Colom.), Sept. 10, 2009, available at http://www.radiosantafe.com/2009/09/10
/ex-secretario-de-salud-de-cordoba-reconocio-sus-nexos-con-los-paramilitares/.
32. See Rodrigo Uprimny and Mauricio Garcia-Villegas, The Constitutional Court
and social emancipation in Colombia, 1 DEMOCRATIZING DEMOCRACY: BEYOND THE
LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC CANON 66-100 (Boaventura Santos et al., eds., 2008); Siri
Gloppen, Litigation as a strategy to hold governments accountable for implementing the
right to health, 10(2) HEALTH & HUM. RTS 21, 27 (2008), available at
http://www.hhrjournal.org/index.php/hhr/article/view/80/148.
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rights in the 1991 Constitution to include economic and social rights,
the Constitution enshrined various structural innovations. Among
the most important innovations that explain the extent of
intervention by the courts and the Court in particular in health are:
(a) the establishment of the Court as a specialized tribunal
overseeing a new "constitutional jurisdiction," which extended to all
Colombian judges; (b) the application of constitutional judicial -
review to specific cases through a protection writ (acci6n de tutela, or
tutela);33 (c) the extension of abstract reviews of legislation through
ex oficio and actio popularis, including the virtual abolition of
standing requirements; and (d) reliance on expert opinions and
outside evidence sources, including medical and scientific experts.
34
III. History of Judicial Enforcement of the Right to Health
Departing from the formal jurisprudence of the Supreme Court
of Colombia, the Court determined that although not denominated
as fundamental rights in the Constitution, social rights could
become fundamental - and enforceable - by virtue of their
connection to fundamental rights (doctrina de conexidad).35 That is,
"when there is an intimate and inextricable relationship with other
fundamental rights," such that failure to immediately protect the
social right would result in the violation these latter fundamental
rights, the social right becomes fundamental. 36 Thus, "in the case of
health, even though it is not a fundamental right, it acquires this
status when not providing care to the ill person would threaten
his/her right to life." 37 A threat to life was interpreted broadly to
mean jeopardizing a life of dignity (vida digna).
33. The tutela is analogous to the amparo in many other Latin American
countries, but has taken on particularities in Colombia, which have made it pivotal
in securing health and other social rights. See Manuel Jos6 Cepeda-Espinosa,
Judicial Activism in a Violent Context: The Origin, Role and Impact of the Colombian
Constitutional Court, 3 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUDIEs L. REv. 529, 537 (2004), available at
http:/ /law.wustl.edu/wugslr/issues/volume3spec/p529Cepedapdf.
34. Ex oficio review refers to types of norms subject to the Court's jurisdiction;
actio popularis permits reviews of legislation with broad collective effects.
35. Colombian Constitutional Court, Judgment T-406/1992 (tutela used to order
sewage system within three months to avoid overflow of black waters because
smell and contamination affected "life with dignity").
36. Id.
37. Colombian Constitutional Court, Judgment T-571/1992 (denial of treatment
for severe Arachnoiditis, a debilitating condition characterized by severe stinging
and burning pain and neurologic problems affected life with dignity).
20101
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In addition to the doctrine of "fundamental rights by virtue of
connection," the jurisprudence of the Court held the right to health
enforceable when the case involved a person or group of people in
especially vulnerable circumstances. For example, the Court has
found special protection for the health rights of the displaced,
pregnant women, children, and the elderly, among others.38
Moreover, the right to receive the health care defined in the POS
was also considered an autonomous, fundamental right.
39
By finding the right to health enforceable when it was
inextricably related not merely to preventing imminent death but to
enabling a life of dignity, a wide range of goods and services
excluded from the POS were conceded to petitioners. 40  For
example, the Court has ordered the provision of anti-retroviral
drugs and costly cancer medications, treatment for severe
psychiatric disorders, and even the financing of treatment of
patients abroad when appropriate treatment was unavailable in
Colombia.41 Although the great majority of cases resolved only the
38. See, e.g., Colombian Constitutional Court, Judgment T-025/2004 (deplorable
conditions and lack of services for displaced persons violated right to health,
among other rights, in the context of an "unconstitutional state of affairs");
Colombian Constitutional Court, Judgment T-1081/2001 (intraocular lens and
medications related to eye surgery conceded as protecting right to health of elderly
person); Colombian Constitutional Court, Judgment SU-225/1998 (meningitis
vaccine for children is part of children's fundamental right to health); Colombian
Constitutional Court, Judgment T-850/2002 (sterilization of a disabled woman
without provisions for her full informed consent affected her right to health).
39. See, e.g., Colombian Constitutional Court, Judgment T-261/2007 (denial of an
intraocular lens in an intraocular lens implant procedure included in the POS
violates the fundamental right to health); Colombian Constitutional Court,
Judgment T-859/2003 (when there is a doubt about inclusion of a joint for joint
replacement surgery under the POS, coverage should be interpreted in line with
providing a functional life of dignity).
40. In assessing "medical necessity," the Constitutional jurisprudence has
placed extraordinary importance on the opinion of the attending, and sometimes
other, physicians. When determining the patient's needs for a given medication or
service the Court repeatedly characterized the issues as a conflict between the
physician, who is presumed to be able to make decisions "based on scientific
criteria," as well as his or her knowledge of the patient, and the HMO that was
making decisions based on financial, bureaucratic, or other criteria. See, e.g.,
Colombian Constitutional Court, Judgment SU-480/1997 ('unification judgment'
announcing general rule of denial of tutela without recommendation by an
attending physician and concession of the same for treatment of HIV with anti-
retrovirals with recommendation of attending physician).
41. See, e.g., Colombian Constitutional Court, Judgments T-409/2000 (concession
of tutela for treatment of severe depression which included suicide attempts);
Colombian Constitutional Court, Judgment SU-819/1999 (minor who suffered from
[Vol. 33:2
Judicial Protection of the Right to Health in Colombia
instant case, the Court's jurisprudence led to changes in health
policies as well. For example, after repeated cases, the state
responded by including viral load tests within the POS, as well as
other diagnostic tests, such as biopsies, given that treatment for
HIV/AIDS and other conditions is dependent upon an accurate
diagnosis.42
Not all of the decisions of the Court have had direct financial
implications; the Court has also issued judgments where there have
been normative and regulatory vacuums.43  Moreover, the
jurisprudence of the Court has denied tutelas when attending
physicians' recommendations have not been present, as well as in
relation to claims for cosmetic procedures, eyeglasses and certain
kinds of eye surgery, fertility treatments, drug and alcohol
rehabilitation, certain prosthetics, gastric bypass operations, dental
services, and allergy treatments when the underlying allergies do
not pose life threatening conditions. 44
Nevertheless, the "fundamental rights by virtue of connection"
doctrine proved inherently subjective. Penile enlargement and
Viagra were conceded by the courts as necessary for a "life of
dignity" while fertility treatments for women, a prosthetic leg and
oxygen tubes (pipetas de oxigeno) were not.45 HMOs argued that the
unpredictable intervention of the courts undermined the stability of
acute leukemia for which the only treatment identified by attending physician
existed abroad, could have such treatment abroad, reiterated in T-414/2001, T-
786/2001 and T-344/2002); Colombian Constitutional Court, Judgment T-271/1995
(concession of anti-retroviral therapy as necessary for treatment of HIV).
42. See, e.g., Colombian Constitutional Court, Judgment T-500/2007 (fundamental
right to diagnosis in case where HMO had classified patient's skin problem as
cosmetic before diagnostic tests were performed); Colombian Constitutional Court,
Judgment T-654/2004 (Uprimny, J., concurring).
43. See e.g., Colombian Constitutional Court, Judgment C-463/2008 (when
petitioners are forced to seek tutelas for Non-POS care because of arbitrariness or
negligence of HMO's scientific-technical committees, only 50% of reimbursement
will be effected). See generally Rodolfo Arango, El derecho a la salud en la
jurisprudencia constitucional, TEORIA CONSTITUCIONAL Y POLITICAS PUBLICAS: BASES
CRTICAS PARA UNA DISCUSION (Manuel Jos6 Cepeda & Eduardo Montealegre eds.,
2007; Aquiles Arrieta, Comentarios a la creaci6n de jurisprudencia constitucional: El caso
del acceso a los servicios de salud, REVISTA TUTELA, AccIONES POPULARES Y DE
CUMPLIMIENTO 1773-1777 (2002).
44. See Colombian Constitutional Court, Judgment T-760/2008, at sec. 3.5.2
(summarizing all denials).
45. See Colombian Constitutional Court, Judgment T-079/2009; Oscar Parra Vera,
EL DERECHO A LA SALUD EN LA CONSTITUCION, LA JURISPRUDENCIA Y LOS INSTRUMENTOS
INTERNACIONALES 286-89,385 (Defensoria del Pueblo ed., 2003).
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insurance contracts with patients.46 Other critics pointed to a
perverse alliance between pharmaceutical companies, doctors, and
judges in "judicially-stimulated corruption" that led to expensive
pharmaceuticals being conceded to patients.47 For example, some
laboratories have provided financial incentives to individual doctors
or to HMOs to use brand-name drugs rather than generics.48
More recent jurisprudence from the Court has attempted to
respond to all of these critiques. Beginning in 2007, the Court
progressively abandoned the doctrine of fundamental rights by
virtue of connection, considering it "artificial" and erroneous to
conceive of certain categories of rights as purely positive and
programmatic, given that all rights have positive, programmatic
facets to them.49 In T-760/08 the Court made clear once and for all
that it was setting aside the doctrine of fundamental rights by virtue
of connection and that, in turn, the doctrine of "special protection
for vulnerable groups" was no longer relevant in determining that
the right to health was indeed fundamental.
50
Thus, rather than determining whether the right to health is
susceptible to protection through the tutela in a given case, the
relevant inquiry became the extent to which aspects of the
fundamental rights to health were enforceable immediately and
which were subject to progressive realization.51 The benefits
contained within the POS, as well as "other required services"
established through jurisprudence, were immediately enforceable.
With respect to progressive realization, jurisprudence from the
Court has established that although the State can allege a lack of
resources to implement a specific obligation, it needs to outline its
plan to obtain the necessary resources, and the respective policies
that such a plan will entail developing, which should in all cases
46. Interview with Juan Manuel Diaz Granados, supra note 8.
47. Interview with Oscar Andia, director, Observamed, in Bogot6, Colom. (Mar.
24, 2009).
48. See Medina, supra note 19, at 42-48; Interview with Oscar Andia, supra note
47; Interview with Juan Manuel Diaz Granados, supra note 8.
49. Colombian Constitutional Court, Judgment T-760/2008, at sec. 3.2.5.
50. Id.
51. Contrast this approach to the "reasonableness" approach taken by the
Constitutional Court of South Africa. See, e.g., Minister of Health v. Treatment Action
Campaign 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) (unreasonable for government not to extend
Nevirapine treatment past 18 pilot sites).
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include opportunities for public participation and deliberation.52
IV. Context for T-760/08
Between 1999 and 2008 the number of tutelas filed regarding
health claims has increased continuously.53 Most of these tutelas
have been to enforce treatments and services that the insurance
companies should have been covering. For example, between 2006
and 2008, 75% of the surgeries, 63% of the exams, 67% of the
treatments, and 78% of the procedures sought through tutela were
all part of what petitioners had a right to under their respective
POS-C and POS-S coverage. 54 Thus, with respect to the majority of
the cases filed, it is misleading to talk about judicial activism.
Judges were merely enforcing pre-existing legal obligations, laid out
in policies designed and enacted by the political branches of
government.55
Another substantial percentage of the reimbursements from the
government solidarity fund, FOSYGA, were due to the so-called
"gray zones" in the POS, together with the systematic failure on the
part of the HMOs to take into account constitutional jurisprudence
that attempted to make those gray zones less gray. For example, the
Human Rights Ombudsman's office documented that in relation to
surgeries, between 2006 and 2008, "the principal source of denials
are surgeries that require some additional input or added material
in order to be realized, such as lenses for cataract surgery, stent
implants [for cardiac catheterization], and orthopedic surgeries
requiring joint replacements."5 6
Yet, since 2003 the jurisprudence of the Court has been
consistent in asserting that materials necessary to carry out a
covered procedure should be considered as included within the
POS, unless expressly excluded. 57 Thus, as pointed out by both the
Human Rights Ombudsman's Office and the Attorney General's
Office in separate reports, the insurance companies have been
52. Colombian Constitutional Court, Judgment T-595/2002 (addressing plan for
needs of disabled in public transport system, including ramps); see also Colombian
Constitutional Court, Judgment T-760/2008, at sec. 3.3.2.
53. Defensoria del Pueblo 2006-08, supra note 3, at 30.
54. Id. at 64-77.
55. PGN/DeJuSticia, supra note 4, at 155-56.
56. Defensoria del Pueblo 2006-08, supra note 3.
57. Colombian Constitutional Court, Judgment T-859/2003, supra note 39.
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"double dipping" - charging patients through premiums and
charging the government again through reimbursements from
FOSYGA.58 Nevertheless, a number of economists in Colombia have
argued that the judicial concession of benefits not explicitly foreseen
in the POS financially destabilizes the system.5 9
More fundamental concerns have been raised with respect to
the equity impacts of judicial interventions of conceding treatments
that could not be universalized. In effect, Colombian courts have
been awarding health benefits based on the morally irrelevant
criterion of who has access to justice.60 This inequity has been
exacerbated greatly by the fact that that those who have historically
benefited from the tutelas are the better off classes, who have a
greater defined benefits package. Studies carried out by the Human
Rights Ombudsman's Office and the Attorney General's
Office/DeJuSticia indicated that over half of claims have been
brought by individuals in the contributory regime. In contrast,
fewer than 20% have been brought by individuals in the subsidized
regime. Based on the numbers of affiliated persons in the regimes,
the Attorney General's Office/DeJuSticia report calculated that in
2003, rates of the use of tutelas for enforcing health claims were
almost six times higher for the contributory regime than the
subsidized regime (184/100,000 v. 33/100,000).61  Moreover,
between 2006 and 2008, Bogota (24.9%), Antioquia (20.1%), Valle
(10.1%) y AtlAntico (5.4%) - that is, la capital three of the wealthiest
departments of the country, represented more than 60% of the
tutelas. By contrast, Vaup~s, Guainia, Vichada and Choc6, which are
among the poorest departments, did not together total even 1% of
the tutelas during the period.62
In addition to fostering this inequity, some studies indicate that
58. Id.; see also PGN/DeJuSticia supra note 4. Similarly, the Court had
repeatedly made it clear that patients could not be denied coverage for catastrophic
conditions on account of, e.g., not having paid premiums for a sufficient length of
time. See Colombian Constitutional Court, Judgment C-463/2008. Yet, patients
continued to have to seek redress through the courts.
59. See Guillermo Perry, Alejandro Gaviria & Mauricio Santamaria, Debate de
coyuntura legislativa: Los retos del sistema de salud en Colombia, 112 INSTITUTO DE
CIENCIA POLTICA 1-4 (2008).
60. Colombian Constitutional Court, Judgment T 654 /2004 (Uprimny, J.,
concurring).
61. PGN/DeJuSticia, supra note 4, at 173.
62. Defensoria del Pueblo 2006-08, supra note 3, at 28.
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the funds disbursed by the FOSYGA for non-POS benefits would
have been better applied to expand coverage, particularly in the
subsidized regime, or fund crucially needed public health
measures. 63 As noted earlier, the extreme inequality in Colombia is
reflected in its health statistics, where some parts of the country
have undergone an epidemiological transition while others continue
to face problems relating to basic sanitation and health
infrastructure. 64 For example, while 99% of the urban population
had access to improved drinking-water sources by 2006 and 86% to
adequate sanitation facilities; these numbers were only 71% and
54%, respectively, for the rural population. 65
In short, by 2008, not only the health system, but the role of the
courts in the health system, had come to be highly controversial in
Colombia. 66 The structural orders in T-760/08 were a response to
the Court's own diagnosis of the situation.
V. T-760/08: A Landmark in Health Rights Protection or a
'Hollow Hope'67?
In July of 2006, the Court began gathering information from
governmental and non-governmental sources, together with
illustrative individual cases in order to inform its structural
approach to violations in the health system. Aquiles Arrieta, the
auxiliary magistrate for Justice Manuel Jos6 Cepeda, alluding to
Brown v. Board of Education, noted that "we were the NAACP and
the Warren Court wrapped into one."
68
T-760/08 selected twenty-two tutelas in order to illustrate
63. Diana Pinto and Maria Isabel Castellanos, Caracterizaci6n de los recobros por
tutela y medicamentos no incluidos en los planes obligatorios de salud, 3 REVISTA
GERENCIA Y POLfTICAS DE SALUD 56 (2004). According to these authors,
approximately 199,000 additional individuals in 2002 and 327,000 additional
individuals in 2003 could be insured using the revenues from the contributory
regime and their associated administrative costs in 2002 and 2003.
64. See WHOSIS, WORLD HEALTH STATISTIcS 2009, available at http://www.
who.int/whosis/whostat/2009/en/index.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2009).
65. UNICEF/WHO JMP for water supply and sanitation, Republic of Colombia:
Improved Water Coverage Estimates (1980-2006), available at http://documents.wss
info.org/resources/documents.html?type=countryjfiles (last visited Dec. 15, 2009).
66. PGN/DeJuSticia, supra note 4, at 57.
67. Gerald Rosenberg, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL
CHANGE? (1991).
68. Interview with Aquiles Arrieta, auxiliary magistrate, Colombian
Constitutional Court, in Bogota, Colom. (Mar. 25,2009).
20101
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
systemic problems in the health system that have led to the overuse
of the tutela. The Court did not declare the health system to be in an
"unconstitutional state of affairs," -as many activists and analysts
had recommended. 69 However, it did call for a significant
restructuring of the health system in addition to resolving the
individual cases. The Court asserted this structural approach was
necessary because "the organs of government responsible for ... the
regulation of the health system have not adopted decisions that
guarantee the right to health without having to seek recourse
through the tutela."70
Twenty of the twenty-two illustrative cases analyzed under T-
760/08 involved principles that the Court has repeatedly
established, but that HMOs had failed to assimilate into their
policies due to a failure of oversight and regulation.71  The
remaining two cases, taken from HMOs, related to reimbursement
for services not included in the POS and adjustments in the
regulations regarding reimbursements.72
In one of its structural orders, the judgment directed the
Commission on Health Regulation (CRES, by its acronym in
Spanish) to immediately and on an annual basis comprehensively
update the benefits included in the POS through a process that
included "direct and effective participation of the medical
community and the users of the health system," 73 in particular those
who would be most affected by policy changes.
Law 100 established the aim of unifying the two benefit
69. According to Manuel Jos6 Cepeda, the author of the judgment, a declaration
of an unconstitutional state of affairs would have allowed the government a long
period to analyze the flaws in the system and come up with proposals to address
them, which in this case would have merely led to greater delays. Interview with
Manuel Jos6 Cepeda Espinosa, former Justice, Colom. Constitutional Court, in
BogotS, Colom. (Mar. 27, 2009).
70. Colombian Constitutional Court, Judgment T-760/2008, supra note 44, at sec.
2.2.
71. Among those cases were restrictions on access to care stemming from
inappropriate transfers of administrative costs to patients and failures to make
access effective (e.g., by ignoring transportation needs), as well as restrictions on
access to care "necessary for the adequate development of a child" (e.g., cochlear
implant), and care for catastrophic conditions. Some cases also addressed the
freedom to choose among providers and the process for determining whether a
given service was included in the POS. Colombian Constitutional Court, Judgment
T-760/2008, supra note 44, at sec. 2.
72. Id. at sec. 8.2.
73. Id. at sec. 6.1.
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regimes. In 2006, the Court issued a judgment that considered the
differentiation in schemes based on ability to pay permissible, but
added that the government should, in keeping with its own stated
objectives, formulate a plan for unification to occur within a
specified time frame.74 Citing the government's failure to take any
steps toward a unification of plans since the adoption of Law 100,
the Court in T-760/08 ordered the CRES to unify the benefit plans
(POS-C and POS-S), initially for children and later for adults. The
plans were to be unified for adults progressively while taking into
account financial sustainability. The process of devising a
unification plan was to be participatory, transparent, evidence-
based, and inclusive of relevant indicators and benchmarks. 75
Furthermore, noting that achieving universal insurance
coverage was an established public policy goal under both Law 100
and subsequent legislation, the judgment called on the government
to adopt deliberate measures to progressively realize universal
coverage and set a 2010 deadline. Additional compliance deadlines
were set for 2008 and 2009.76
The Court's decision is notable for, among other things, the
explicit adoption of the right to health framework set out by the
United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(UN ESC Rights Committee).77 For example, in keeping with the
UN ESC Rights Committee's interpretation of the right to health, the
Court: (a) elaborated on the multiple dimensions of state obligations
that flow from the right to health, including the role of oversight
and regulation of a market-based scheme to protecting the right to
health; (b) reiterated that the state is responsible for adopting
deliberate measures to achieve progressive realization of the right to
health and that retrogression is generally impermissible; and (c)
asserted that the right to health calls for transparency and access to
information, as well as for evidence-based planning and coverage
decisions based on participatory processes.
The Court reiterated that the right to health contains an
74. Colombian Constitutional Court, Judgment C-1032/2006 (finding
Constitutional the two-scheme health system under Law 100).
75. Colombian Constitutional Court, Judgment T-760/2008, supra note 44, at sec.
6.1.
76. Id.
77. U.N. COMMITTEE ON ECON., SOC. & CULTURAL RTS, General Comment 14 on the
Right to Health, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (2000).
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essential core content or nucleus (nucleo esencial) which should be
guaranteed immediately to all persons, as well as other elements
subject to progressive realization. In addition to what is defined
through the government benefits scheme, care that falls outside the
POS can be immediately enforced through tutelas when (a) the lack
of the medical service threatens a patient's minimum level of
subsistence (mfnimo vital); (b) the service cannot be substituted by
one contained within the POS; (c) the patient cannot afford to pay
the price of the required treatment or medication and cannot obtain
said treatment or medication through any other healthcare regime
such as insurance plans provided by employers, pre-paid
complementary plans, etc.; and (d) the service has been ordered by
an attending physician.78 The Court attempted to establish a
minimum core as distinct from any particular set of interventions
that might be legislated through the POS. However, other than
what had already been excluded, such as cosmetic procedures, the
Court did not firmly define the limits of an immediately enforceable
right to healthcare. 79
Instead, the Court called for a broad public dialogue about the
content of the new POS, and by extension the dimensions of the
right to healthcare in Colombia. The Court did not assume it knew
best what benefits should be included under the POS, nor did it set
out ethical grounds for making those determinations. Instead it
called upon the CRES to fulfill its legal obligations pursuant to prior
legislation. The Court did stipulate that the process might well
result in exclusions from the current POS, and that it would prima
facie consider that such elimination was not regressive so long as
each elimination was justified.80
Although the Court was criticized for its failure to "limit the
right to health in a constitutionally permissible and financially
sustainable manner," the justice who authored the opinion, stated in
an interview that such a definition of the scope was neither
politically practicable, nor appropriate for the Court to undertake.81
78. See Colombian Constitutional Court, Judgment T-760/2008, supra note 44, at
sec. 3; see, e.g., Colombian Constitutional Court, Judgment SU-480/1997, supra note
39.
79. Colombian Constitutional Court, Judgment T-760/2008, supra note 44, at sec.
3.5.2.
80. Id. at sec 6.1.1.2.2.
81. For this critique of the Court, see Rodrigo Uprimny and Diana Rodriguez
Franco, Aciertos e insuficiencias de la sentencia T-760 de 2008: implicaciones para el
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In general, the Court's approach to a remedy can be seen as
consistent with theories of "experimentalist regulation" and
"dialogical justice." As Charles Sabel and William Simon have
written, an experimentalist regulation regime "leaves the parties
with a substantial range of discretion as to how to achieve [the goals
set out by the court]. At the same time, it specifies both standards
and procedures for the measurement of the institution's
performance."8 2 Although the Court has yet to set out clear
standards and procedures for the measurement of the health
system's performance, as it did with respect to a previous decision
related to internally displaced persons (T-025/04), Roberto
Gargarella has described T-760/08 as a positive example of judicial
contribution to deliberative democracy. Gargarella argues that the
Court strove to ensure that political decisions setting health
priorities responded to an exchange of arguments in public forums,
rather than to the pressure of interest groups. The Court pushed for
consideration of structural problems that the Colombian legislature
had not addressed, which consequently resulted in the systematic
violation of fundamental rights. Gargarella also supports the
Court's call "for public audiences in order to ensure that difficult
constitutional problems [such as the scope of the right to health] are
properly discussed by all those potentially affected."83
T-760/08 can also be seen as consistent with proposals for
ethical healthcare priority-setting, such as Norman Daniels's
"accountability for reasonableness." 84 Daniels argues that we do not
have fine-tuned principles that tell us how to meet health needs
fairly - what priority to place on the worst off, etc. - when we
cannot meet them all.85 Therefore, he asserts that we need to fall
derecho a la salud en Colombia, 18 OBSERVATORIO DE LA SEGURIDAD SOCIAL (2008);
interview with Manuel Jos6 Cepeda Espinosa, former Justice, Colom. Constitutional
Court, in Bogota, Colom. (Mar. 26, 2009).
82. Charles Sabel and William Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law
Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015, 1019 (2004).
83. Roberto Gargarella, Dialogic Justice in the Enforcement of Social Rights in
Litigating Health Rights, Can Courts Bring More Justice to Health? (forthcoming 2011).
84. NORMAN DANIELS, JUST HEALTH: MEETING HEALTH NEEDS FAIRLY 274
(Cambridge University Press 2008); Norman Daniels, Accountability for
Reasonableness, 321 BRITISH MED J. 1300, 1301 (2000); see also Eduardo Gonzalez-Pier,
Cristina Guti6rrez-Delgado and Gretchen Stevens, Priority Setting for Health
Interventions in Mexico's System of Social Protection in Health, 368 LANCET 1608, 1618
(2006).
85. See generally DANIELS, JUST HEALTH: MEETING HEALTH NEEDS FAIRLY, supra
2010]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
back on a fair process, that is (a) transparent, in that the grounds for
decisions are made public; (b) based on relevant reasons (i.e.,
appropriate patient care versus racial or gender stereotypes, etc.); (c)
revisable through some kind of appeals procedure because there
will always be new factors to consider as well as atypical cases; and
(d) enforceable. 86 As a general matter, T-760/08 called for just such
processes to define the updated benefits packages as well as the
unified benefits schemes for children and adults.
VI. Implementation of T-760/08
In March of 2009, the Court's composition changed
substantially, partly due to the departure of the justice who drafted
the opinion, Manuel Jos6 Cepeda. 87 Nevertheless, the new Court
oversaw the implementation of the judgment's complex structural
orders by way of a special "Review Panel." This action
demonstrated a continued commitment to the judgment.88
From the outset, however, the Uribe administration resisted
genuine implementation of the T-760/08 judgment. For example, in
August of 2008, shortly after the judgment was issued, Minister of
Social Protection (MSP) Diego Palacio estimated it would cost as
much as Col. 6.5 trillion (approximately U.S. $3.25 billion) to unify
note 84, at 103-60.
86. Id.
87. See Corte Constitutional, Magistrados anteriores, http://www.corte
constitucional.gov.co/lacorte/magistradosanteriores.php (last visited Apr. 2, 2010).
88. In July of 2009, this special Review Panel issued 16 orders (autos) requesting
information regarding the implementation of the judgment. In some cases, the
Court returned the information proffered by the MSP and clarified that the
responsibility of the Ministry was to provide "qualitative and quantitative
parameters that enable assessments of follow-up on the problems identified. See
Colombian Constitutional Court, Judgment T-760/2008 (July 13, 2009) (Order related
to presentation of quarterly report by the EPS). Other orders warned the MSP
regarding the imminent approach of deadlines set in T-760/2008 and the need to
comply with the judgment or request new deadlines based upon clearly justified
and reasoned arguments and specific plans. A number of the orders sought
information regarding the methodologies being used to implement the judgment,
regarding for example the calculation of the capitation rate for the subsidized
regime, and the process for selecting that methodology. See Colombian
Constitutional Court, Judgment T-760/2008 (July 13, 2009) (Order related to
comprehensive actualization of POS). Still others requested information regarding
the number of tutelas that had been ordered which were related to issues in T-
760/2008. See Colombian Constitutional Court, Judgment T-760/2008 (july 13, 2009)
(Order related to measuring the number of tutelas).
[Vol. 33:2
Judicial Protection of the Right to Health in Colombia
the benefit plans, which he asserted "the State does not have."8 9
Whether the state has the resources is arguable. Nor has there
been any debate about the meaning of scarcity of resources in a
country in which military spending is similar or superior to that of
education and health combined. 90 However, it may indeed be the
case that the unification of benefit schemes is not compatible with
the current financing scheme for health insurance, which is based
upon payroll taxes. As the Court itself acknowledged in the
opinion, the financing system has become increasingly precarious,
given the reduction in formal employment.91 That is, the percentage
of insured in the contributory regime has remained relatively stable,
but the percentage in the subsidized regime rose from 16% to 53%
between 1993 and 2009.92 Without addressing the underlying trend
toward labor flexibilization, universalization will increase payroll
taxes on the formal sector for those in the contributory regime,
which will likely lead to people transferring to the informal sector
and the POS-S, which will again increase payroll taxes on the formal
sectors. 93
In addition to claiming a lack of resources, the government has
largely ignored the Court's emphasis on reasoned public debate.94
Serious deficiencies in creating a meaningful participatory process
89. Unificaci6n del sistema de salud costard cerca de 6.5 billones de pesos, CAMBIO
(Colom.), Aug. 27, 2008, available at http://www.cambio.com.co/economiacambio
/791/ARTICULOPRINTERFRIENDLYPRINTER_FRIENDLYCAMBIO-
4470311.htrnl (last visited Nov. 15, 2009).
90. See Luis Jorge Garay, Claudia Herrera y Uriel Torres, El gasto militar y en
defensa en Colombia: Evoluci6n reciente y estructura, ECONOMIA COLOMBIANA Y
COYUNTURA POLITICA 322 (2008); Jos6 Fernando Isaza and Di6genes Campos, Juegos
de guerra. El presupuesto de seguridad para 2008 va a ser de $22,2 billones, EL
ESPECTADOR (Colom.), Dec. 19, 2007, available at http://www.elespectador.com/
impreso/cuadernilloa/negocios/articuloimpreso-juegos-guerra (last visited Feb.
10, 2010); Diana Rojas, Colombia, pais con mds gasto militar de Amdrica Latina,
COLOMBIA PARA TODOS (Colom.), Mar. 13, 2008, available at http://www.
colombiaparatodos.net/noicia-colombia-colombia-paissconmas-gastomilitar
deamericalatina-id-3111.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2010).
91. See Colombian Constitutional Court, Judgment T-760/2008, supra note 44, at
section 6.1.2 nn. 44-45.
92. Natalia Millan, FEDESARROLLO, presentation at the University of the
Andes (Mar. 25,2009).
93. See, e.g., Mauricio Santamaria and Guillermo Perry, El fallo de la Corte sobre
salud: La Trinidad Imposible, 46 ECONOMIA Y POI..TICA (2008).
94. See POS, Guia Metodol6gica para el desarrollo de gufas de prdctica basadas en la
evidencia, http://www.pos.gov.co/Paginas/guiaMetodologica.aspx (last visited
Dec. 1, 2009).
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have related to a lack of information and transparency with regard
to fora for participation and criteria for decisionmaking, as well as
lack of access to public consultations organized by the MSP.95 On
repeated occasions, the CRES issued accords immediately before
court-set deadlines without substantive input from different stake-
holders, and without setting forth meaningful methodologies for its
determinations of treatments and services to be included in
coverage schemes.
96
However, the most telling response of the government to T-
760/08 was President Uribe's "Declaration of a Social Emergency"
in December 2009. 97 Pursuant to this Declaration, the Executive
moved swiftly to issue a series of decrees that circumvented any
popular discussion whatsoever. Some of these decrees were aimed
at injecting resources into the health system through centralizing
reimbursements, eliminating fraud and corruption, and imposing
new taxes on beer, cigarettes and gambling.98 Notably, efforts to
control costs did not attempt to re-regulate the pharmaceutical
industry, which was largely deregulated under President Uribe.99
95. Id.; see also Camila Gianella-Malca, Oscar Parra-Vera, Alicia Ely Yamin and
Mauricio Torres-Tovar, Z Deliberaci6n Democrdtica o Mercadeo Social? Los dilemas de la
definici6n pblica en salud en el contexto del seguimiento de la sentencia T-760 de 2008, 11
HEALTH AND HUM. RTs (2009), available at http://hhrjournal.org/blog/wp-
content/uploads/2009/08/gianella-malca.pdf. (last visited Feb. 14, 2010).
96. Comisi6n de Regulaci6n en Salud, ACUERDO 03 (Aug. 3, 2009); Comisi6n de
Regulaci6n en Salud ACUERDO 04 (Sept. 30, 2009); Comisi6n de Regulaci6n en
Salud, ACUERDO 08 (2009); Carlos Cortes, El Plan Obligatorio de Salud: antes no; ahora,
tampoco, LA SILLA VACIA (Colom.), Oct. 1, 2009, available at http://www.lasillavacia.
com/historia/4554 (last visited Feb. 12, 2010).
97. Exec. Decree 4975/09 (Colom.), Dec. 23, 2009, available at http://web.
presidencia.gov.co/decretoslinea/2009/diciembre/23/dec497523122009.pdf. (last
visited Feb. 14, 2010).
98. See, e.g., Exec. Decrees 4976/09; 073/10; 074/10; 075/10; 127/10; 139/10,
available at http://web.presidencia.gov.co/decretoslinea/2010. Estimates are that
the decrees could raise close to USD 1 billion; see Ivan Jaramillo Perez, La emergencia
social en salud: ZError o jugada maestra?, http://www.medinformatica.net/
OBSERVAMED/ReformaSistemaSalud/EmergenciaSocial2010/EmergenciaSocial_
CometariosIJP.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2010).
99. See, e.g., Commission on the Pricing of Medications, Ministry of Social
Protection, CIRCULAR 001 (2004), available at http://www.medinformatica.com
/OBSERVAMED/Circularl-04CNPM.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2010); Commission
on the Pricing of Medications, Ministry of Social Protection, CIRCULAR 004 (2006),
available at http://www.medinformatica.com/OBSERVAMED/Circular406CNPM
.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2010); see Carlos Cort(s Castillo, El peso de los medicamentos
en la emergencia social, LA SILLA VACIA (Colorn.), Feb. 11, 2010, available at
http://www.lasillavacia.com /historia/6657 (last visited Feb. 14, 2010) (comment
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Nor were emergency powers used to attempt to combat price-fixing
and other anti-competitive practices relating to excluding services
among HMOs.100
Other decrees limited patients' rights to certain care - in
particular specialized care - under the POS, as well access to tutelas
through the courts.101 The decrees created a technical body to
regulate POS and non-POS care, which will determine medical
necessity rather than leaving those decisions to attending
physicians. Pursuant to the decrees, payments for "exceptional
services" - those outside the POS - could only be provided when
the petitioner demonstrated an absolute lack of resources.10 2 Thus,
whereas in the past the courts had considered whether paying for a
medical service would affect a petitioner's "minimum level of
subsistence," 103 under the new decrees pensions and other assets can
(and must) be liquidated to pay for medical costs.104
Critics of the Declaration of a State of Emergency asserted that
the FOSYGA has close to 5 trillion pesos (approximately U.S. $2.5
billion) invested in public bonds and certificates of deposit, which
would be sufficient to cover the debts in the system.105 Others point
to the fact that the HMOs, which are among the largest and most
profitable businesses in Colombia, are the principal beneficiaries of
the emergency decrees while already struggling public hospitals are
on failure of social emergency decrees to address this).
100. See A la Supersalud le lleg6 la hora de ajustar a las Clinicas de EPS, EL TIEMPO
(Colom.), Apr. 27, 2009; Cuestionan a Saludcoop por uso de recursos, PORTAFOLIO
(Colom.), July 7, 2009. According to the media, the Superintendencia de Industria y
Comercio was investigating the 15 HMOs that constitute the Association of HMOs,
ACEMI, in relation to agreements to restrict free competition and to exclude certain
services from the POS. See Quince EPS en la mira del Gobierno Nacional, LA LIBERTAD
(Colom.), June 9, 2009.




103. See supra Part III.
104. Exec. Decree 128/10 (Colom.), Jan. 21, 2010, available at http://web.
presidencia.gov.co/decretoslinea/2010/enero/21/dec2821012010.pdf (last visited
Feb. 14, 2010).
105. See El problema es el mal manejo que le han dado a los dineros de la salud, SEMANA
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left worse off.106
Criticism of the decrees was not limited to academic fora; they
created a furor among patient and medical associations. 107 By
February 2010, mass protests were taking place across Colombia
using the slogan "health is not a favor; it's a right." 08 Presidential
candidates, academics, members of Congress, and even
representatives of the Catholic Church in Colombia publicly
denounced the government's attempts to restrict the right to
health.109
In the next few months, the Court will have to take a position
on the legality of decrees issued by the Executive. Until now, the
Court has merely requested information but has not issued any
orders with respect to the emergency decrees.110 It is foreseeable
that the Court will declare these decrees unconstitutional. The
jurisprudence is clear in stating that a state of emergency requires
more than an assertion of economic, social or environmental
conditions that might disturb public order; it requires a
106. Id.; see also Daniel Coronell, D6nde estd la bolita, SEMANA (Colom.), Jan. 30,
2010, available at http://www.semana.com/noticias-opinion/donde-estabolita/
134332.aspx (last visited Apr. 7, 2010).
107. See, e.g., Federaci6n M~dica Colombiana, Andlisis, Pronunciamientos, Noticias
y Opiniones sobre la crisis del sector salud y los Decretos de Emergencia Social,
http://www.med-informatica.net/EmergenciaSocial2010.htm (last visited Feb. 12,
2009).
108. Miles de personas protestan en varias ciudades contra la Emergencia Social, EL
ESPECTADOR (Colom.), Feb. 6, 2010, available at http://www.elespectador.com/
noticias/salud/articulol86238-miles-de-personas-protestan-varias-ciudades-contra
-emergencia-social, (last visited Feb. 7, 2010); Protestas en Colombia contra medidas
para evitar el colapso de servicios de salud, AGENCE FRANCE PRESS, Feb. 07, 2010,
available at http://colombia.indymedia.org/news/2O1/O2/111342.php (last visited Feb. 14,
2010).
109. See Iglesia pide que sean ajustados los decretos de la Emergencia Social, EL TIEMPO
(Colom.), Feb. 8, 2010, available at http://www.eltiempo.com/vidadehoy/salud/
iglesia-pide-que-se-ajusten-los-decretos-de-emergencia-social_7146108-1 (last
visited Feb. 14, 2010); Miles de personas protestan en varias ciudades contra la
Emergencia Social, EL ESPECTADOR (Colom.), Feb. 6, 2010, available at http://www.
elespectador.com/noticias/salud/articulol86238-miles-de-personas-protestan-
varias-ciudades-contra-emergencia-social, (last visited Feb. 7, 2010).
110. In particular, they requested "studies or supporting material that led them
to conclude that the facts set out in the declaration of emergency surpassed the
capacity of existing mechanisms, sanctioning ability and mandate of the system of
inspection, regulation and oversight of the health sector." Congreso y Corte
Constitucional revisardn emergencia social, SEMANA (Colom.), Feb. 2, 2010, available at
http://www.semana.com/noticias-salud--seguridad-social/congreso-corte-
constitucional-revisaran-emergencia- social/134188.aspx (last visited Feb. 13, 2010).
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demonstration that the emergency does not stem from chronic and
foreseeable structural problems, and that normal institutional
mechanisms are inadequate to resolve the crisis.1 1
VII. Implications for Dialogical Justice
Much of the literature regarding the role of the judiciary in the
enforcement of social rights places great importance on the process
of deliberation set into motion by the courts. 112  This public
deliberation and the continued scrutiny of public values it entails
can shape how we assess justice - and the need for equality - in
health and other spheres.113 Yet meaningful deliberative discussion
is contingent on the context in which it occurs and what is up for
contention.11 4 As Nancy Frazer has argued about the preconditions
for effective participation in other contexts, "it does require the sort
of rough equality that is inconsistent with systemically-generated
relations of dominance and subordination." 115 Frazer argues that in
"stratified societies" - i.e., societies whose basic institutional
framework systematically generates unequal social groups - "full
parity of participation in public debate and deliberation is not
within the reach of possibility."
116
Not only does the Colombian context present extreme social
inequalities, but certain interest groups - such as HMOs - are
extremely well organized and exercise great economic clout in
contrast to unorganized patients who have little or no economic
means. Thus, the "rules of the game" for democratic deliberation
111. See, e.g., Colombian Constitutional Court, Judgment C-136/2009 (Feb. 25,
2009) (finding constitutional the declaration of a state of emergency based on the
grave and imminent threat to the social order posed by certain unauthorized
activities that were using up public resources).
112. See generally COURTS AND SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: AN
INSTITUTIONAL VOICE FOR THE POOR? (Roberto Gargarella, Pilar Domingo & Theunis
Roux, eds., 2006); DEMOCRATIZATION AND THE JUDICIARY: THE ACCOUNTABILITY
FUNCTION OF COURTS IN NEW DEMOCRACIES (Roberto Gargarella, Siri Gloppen &
Ellen Skaar, eds., 2004); CASS SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: WHAT
CONSTITUTIONS Do 68 (2001); MARK TUSHNET, WEAK COURTS, STRONG RIGHTS:
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND SOCIAL WELFARE RIGHTS IN COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
(2007).
113. Id.
114. Nancy Fraser, Rethinking the public sphere: A contribution to the critique of
actually existing democracy, 25/26 SOCIAL TExT 56, 66-67 (1990).
115. Id. at 65.
116. Id. at 66.
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about the parameters of the right to health might only be expected
to entrench profound imbalances in power. Indeed, during the first
fifteen months after the decision, this is exactly what seemed to
occur, as the CRES seemed incapable of real implementation and
effective of oversight of the powerful interest groups.
117
Moreover T-760/08, in contrast with the aforementioned
structural decision regarding internally displaced persons, was not
linked with a strong social movement struggling for implementation
of the decision.118 Indeed, some members of the national movement
for health argued that the decision was not worth supportig
because it distracted attention from the structural failings of a health
system predicated on the fundamental assumption that healthcare
was a commodity rather than a public good.119
However, while the initial implementation of the judgment
seemed to entrench rather than destabilize steep asymmetries of
power in the Colombian health care context, the government's
declaration of a state of emergency has changed the dynamic for a
variety of interest groups, as well as for the legislature and the
Court itself. 120 Indeed, as of this writing, the effect of T-760/08 may
well have been to create what Sabel and Simon refer to as
"destabilization rights":
117. See Olga Lucia Muftoz L6pez, Emergencia social: la salud en estado de sitio, EL
PuLso, Mar. 6, 2010, available at http://www.periodicoelpulso.com/
html/1003mar/debate/debate-01.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2010).
118. See Colombian Constitutional Court, Judgment T-025/2004, (situation of
displaced represented "unconstitutional state of affairs"; court set up ongoing
monitoring of the situation through broadly participatory process including public
hearings); see also CCsar A. Rodriguez Garavito and Diana Rodriguez Franco, Un
giro en los estudios sobre derechos sociales: El impacto de los fallos judiciales y el caso del
desplazamiento forzado en Colombia, in LA PROTECCION JUDICIAL DE LOS DERECHOS
SOCIALES, (Christian Courtis & Ramiro Avila Santamaria eds., 2009), available at
http://www.minjusticia-ddhh.gov.ec/images/stories/Libro_11_Proteccion_
judicial. pdf (last visited Apr. 7, 2010).
119. Interview with Organizers of Tercer Congreso Nacional por la Salud, in
Bogotd, Colom. (Mar. 26, 2009); see also Carlos Ivin Pacheco, Luego de 15 afios de la
Ley 100 de 1993. El derecho fundamental de la salud para todos los Colombianos, LE
MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE: COLOMBIA EDITION (2009) at 78, available at
http://eldiplo.info/mostrar articulo.php?id=904&numero=78 (last visited Apr. 7,
2010); Daniel Alzate, presentation at Universidad Nacional de Colombia, Oct. 9,
2009, available at http://www.agenciadenoticias.unal.edu.co/nc/detalle/article
/denuncias-contra-el-sistema-de-salud-colombiano/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2010).
120. The state of emergency permits Executive decrees to take effect for a year
and afterward, legislative action will be required to enact permanent laws.
POLITICAL CONSTITUTION OF COLOMBIA, art. 215 (1991).
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claims to unsettle and open up public institutions that have
chronically failed to meet their obligations and that are
substantially insulated from the normal processes of political
accountability .... The effect of the court's initial intervention is to
destabilize the parties' pre-litigation expectations through
political, cognitive, and psychological effects that widen the
possibilities of experimentalist collaboration.
121
That is, for the first time, the right to health is a matter of broad
public debate in Colombia and the design and feasibility of the
entire health system are being actively discussed. The Executive's
initial inaction has given way to dramatic measures by the Uribe
Administration, and crucially, the non-left middle classes and social
leaders.122 Based on U.S. public law litigation experiences, Sabel and
Simon write that after the initial destabilization, "the regimes of
standards and monitoring that commonly emerge from remedial
negotiation allow this destabilization, and the learning it generates,
to continue within narrower channels." 123 We will soon see whether
this proves to be the case in the Colombian context.
VIII. Conclusions
The judicial protection of programmatic dimensions of the right
to health has steadily increased in Colombia since 1992, and
jurisprudence regarding the enforceability of the right to health is
perhaps the most progressive in the world. Yet the overall trend in
judicial activism and the T-760/08 judgment may in fact reinforce
the effects of the 1993 health reform, which invested the majority of
the health budget in individual insurance, and thereby neglected
public health promotion and prevention plans that might have
provided a greater benefit to a larger population (see, e.g.,
vaccination programs). Further empirical investigation is called for
to assess what the effects on equity are, and whether the overall
121. Sabel & Simon, supra note 82, at 1020.
122. Miles de personas protestan en varias ciudades contra la Emergencia Social, EL
ESPECTADOR (Colom.), Feb. 6, 2010, available at http://www.elespectador.com
/ noticias/salud/articulol86238-miles-de-personas-protestan-varias-ciudades-
contra -emergencia-social, (last visited Feb. 7, 2010); Ministro Palacio no convenci6 en
foro de la Javeriana sobre Emergencia Social, EL TIEMPO (Colom.), Feb. 12, 2010, available
at http://www.eltiempo.com/vidadehoy/salud/ministro-palacio-no-convencio-
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health system's infrastructure and workforce, as well as public
health promotion, is neglected as a result of policies stemming from
the decision.124
Importantly, in T-760/08 the Constitutional Court
acknowledged the limitations of individual concession of health
benefits and attempted to foster a public dialogue among different
actors regarding constitutionally permissible limitations on the right
to health that might guide discussions. However, the Colombian
healthcare context presented profound challenges for such
"dialogical" judicial activism, in that steep social and power
inequalities, coupled with low social mobilization around health
care, made, and continue to make it extremely difficult for a
dialogue to be held on equal terms. Nonetheless, T-760/08
unleashed a dramatic response from the government in the form of
a series of emergency decrees relating to health care financing and
regulation, which in turn destabilized the interests of some of the
formerly insulated institutions within the Colombian health system.
The story of the Constitutional Court's role in the judicial
protection of health rights is not over. As of this writing, it is
unclear what the ultimate impact of the T-760/08 decision will be.
On February 26, 2010, the Constitutional Court rejected as
unconstitutional a referendum law that would have allowed Uribe
to attempt to run for a third term as president, thereby promising a
new administration and the possibility of a new approach to
implementing the right to health.125
If the emergency decrees are held to be unconstitutional, the
next administration will have to determine how to respond to the
structural orders in T-760/08, as well as the underlying crisis in the
health system. In the wake of the government's emergency decrees,
the Colombian public seems, on the one hand, to have suddenly
recognized the right to health as a fundamental claim of citizenship
under the 1991 Constitution. In the best case scenario, this may
open up new spaces for negotiation and produce a highly salutary
debate about the kind of health system that Colombian society
124. The Declaration of a State of Emergency called for the prioritization of
preventative public health measures but how this would be implemented is entirely
unclear.
125. Colombian Constitutional Court, Judgment C-141/2010 (finding
unconstitutional legislation that would have allowed a referendum to approve the
possibility of a third presidential re-election).
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requires. On the other hand, should the new administration attempt
to push through reforms that only nominally address the regulatory,
financing and structural defects in the health system, it will surely
provoke a continuing institutional crisis. Much will depend upon
the level of scrutiny the Court exercises over the degree of
implementation of T-760/08, and whether it actively engages with a
wide range of citizens through public hearings and follow-up
committees (comitds de seguimiento), as it has in an earlier structural
judgment involving internally displaced people.126 The coming
months will reveal whether and to what extent the Court can
facilitate meaningful democratic deliberation about the scope and
permissible limitations on a constitutionally recognized right to
health in Colombia.
126. Colombian Constitutional Court, Judgment T-025/04.
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